

on the Mediterranean, Russia's "hardened" attitude towards the Syrian crisis is largely related to the complex relations between Russia and European countries and the United States, : Missile shield, disarmament, human rights issues and the Iranian nuclear issue, as well as the legacy of US interventions in countries close to Russia.

In addition to the whole record of disagreements with the West, President Putin has a desire to regain Russia's role as a key player in the Middle East and international geopolitics. He tries to exploit President Obama's weaknesses, especially his refusal to use any form of military force to resolve regional conflicts, the diplomatic approach to help find solutions, which, according to Obama's doctrine, remains the responsibility of regional powers.

The Russian concerns generated by the Western military intervention in Libya cannot be ignored. The generalization of this intervention will include Syria, which will open the door for Western military intervention in the geographical surroundings near Russia. It also opens the possibility that Iran is targeted after Syria, especially since Russia has strategic ties and interests with it, so it can not accept to lose its allies in the Middle East: Iran and Syria.

Russia understands that its success in preventing any Western military intervention inside Syria for humanitarian reasons will prolong the life of the Assad regime, but this will not protect it from fragmentation and fall in the future. It is well aware that regional and international geopolitics will not allow President Assad to play any role in leading Syria. In the future. From here, Russia's hardening of support for the regime is only a way to gain time for Moscow until a political dialogue is established that believes Russian interests in Syria and the region.

Some Russian leaders have issued statements asserting that Moscow does not hold the lion's eye, and senior Russian sources have said that the date of Assad's departure from power has not been stopped, but

such an assessment of the weakness of the regime has not prevented the shipment of Russian arms and ammunition to the regime.

Russia can not stop its support for the Syrian regime because such a move would expose Iran to more pressures and risks, especially in terms of threatening its influence in Iraq, Lebanon and the Gulf region. To push Iran into a defensive position would be in the interests of the United States and its regional allies.

Russian diplomacy has begun to feel that it has reached as far as it can do through the diplomacy of reluctance it has adopted to prevent Western intervention in Syria, that it cannot continue with this rigid policy and that there is a possibility to face the threat of Arab and international isolation. This reinforces the belief that Russia now strongly wants to create a platform for dialogue between the Syrian government and the opposition. This is indicated by her invitation to Ahmed Moat Khatib to visit Moscow, and show willingness to host the dialogue, and the round of talks between Lavrov and John Kerry positive, and can be built on them in order to find common ground to facilitate co-operation in the future.

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SYRIAN CRISIS, THE KEY INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS IN THE CRISIS

Chalan Said

СИРИЙСКИЙ КРИЗИС, КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЕ ИГРОКИ В КРИЗИСЕ

Чалан Саид

ABSTRACT

This article examines the international conflict in Syria, who are the main players in this conflict, and clarifying the objectives of the major countries of this strong conflict in this region, after using all kinds of weapons in this conflict and using media, money and religion.

And the participation of regional and international countries to send soldiers and the construction of military bases in Syria must be studied and analyzed what the purpose of each country and what you want in Syria.

Introducation

Events are intensifying around and inside Syria. It has become clear that Syria is the center of a fierce global conflict that uses all kinds of firearms, media, finance and religion. The importance of Syria as an international strategic decision stems mainly from its geographical location in the north of Israel and its being the main gate for Iran to the world after the imposition

of the Western siege on Iran. Syria's importance lies in its mediation of the most important economic zone in the world market and its representation as a locomotive that could shake the world's richest oil and gas countries Today

Eight years ago there were 23 million people living in Syria, as many as 12 million are now gone. More than 500,000 have been killed, 7.6 million have fled

their homes, but remain inside Syria. More than four million more have fled the country.

The crisis in Syria has led to a dangerous mix of players. Syria's President Assad is reaching out to old friends.

ISIS is entrenched. The US and some of its allies are involved. Russia is the most prominent player in Syria. Turkey's President Erdogan is ordering airstrikes, the Saudis are issuing threats, and Iranian soldiers are already on the ground. Qatar, Syrian Kurds, and Lebanon's Hezbollah are also important players.

During the poll we conducted on this subject, I found different opinions on the subject of the Syrian conflict. There was a consensus among the respondents that Russia is the main player. The participants agreed that Russia and the Syrian army are the two main bodies in the fight against terrorism. On the other hand, The United States is not helping to fight terrorism but is seeking a continuation of the conflict in Syria.

I suggested that a peaceful solution to the international conflict in Syria should be found so as not to develop into a wider war because the situation in Syria is not likely to be mistaken by any parties, so a peaceful solution must be found free of violence

Given the number of players in this small arena, how can this conflict possibly end well? Here's a breakdown of what each player wants.

1- Russia

Russia has a special place to protect and fortify the meanings and consequences of this position resulting from Russia taking the first strategic initiative of its kind in its history, including the Soviet Union, by intervening militarily with its armed forces in a war Outside of its borders, and in a traditional American area bordered by Atlantic Turkey on the one hand and Israel on the other and the American presence on the other. Moscow had already thrown its weight to prevent US military intervention two years ago, Syrian conflict. In the context of a regular and high-level US talk about the future of the situation in Syria, especially the future of the Syrian president, which came Russia's forces to support him, giving the Russian military initiative a qualitative position in the strategic calculations, not the least readiness to impose a fait accompli by force on the superpower corresponding to America.

The five Russian goals ... in Syria

The information speaks of five objectives that outline the outline of the Russian strategy in Syria:

1. Russia has entered into the Syrian crisis to fight terrorism after terrorists controlled most of Syrian territory.
2. Securing Russia's influence over the Mediterranean Sea, in Syria, the last Arab country allied to Russia in the Middle East.
3. Working in the American space direct, the establishment of military bases on the border with Turkey, in order to balance with the US influence in Ukraine
4. Facing extremist groups in the Middle East, to prevent them from returning to Russia.
5. To strengthen the alliance with Iran in Syria, which is the maritime port of the vital Silk Road of China-Russia-Iran to reach the warm waters of the

Mediterranean Sea. This way Afghanistan needs to reach Iran and Iraq to reach Syria, with the paradox that Afghanistan and Iraq are countries occupied by America to cut the Silk Road between China, Russia and Iran in Afghanistan and between Iran and Syria in Iraq. The US project has suffered a major defeat in both countries.

Russia adopts a phased plan to implement its strategy in Syria:

A - The Russian military base in Lattakia has been secured. Large radars have been completed in Salnafa and in the Syrian coastline. The modern T-90 tanks have been deployed around the Russian base in Lattakia, the deployment of a satellite-related missile defense system and the transfer of tens of tons of Advanced military equipment via an air bridge between Russia and Syria.

B - rely on the Syrian army on the ground and provide logistical support without engaging in ground warfare significantly, and comes in the forefront of logistical support to provide air support and information, and the opening of Russian satellites for Syrian Sukhoi aircraft, after Moscow refused to meet this Syrian request previously, The exchange of information and the submission of Moscow images taken by the industrial satellites of the movements of armed groups, centers and gathering methods of supply warehouses and weapons caches, as well as the introduction of the Syrian military communications system in the Russian system, including meetings of military leaders across Satellites.

C - to work militarily soon to stabilize the ally through air and information support to restore some important and sensitive areas and thus weaken the role of Turkey, while at the same time restore important areas of the hands of a supporter, to prove what Russia and Syria say that the Syrian army is the only force capable of fighting The land after the American failure to hit her by air and fighting over land through groups trained by US intelligence in Turkey and soon joined the victory immediately after entering the Syrian territory.

2- United States

The mantra of the Trump administration is that it is only in Syria to fight Isis. Policing the use of chemical weapons with airstrikes is portrayed as an exceptional responsibility, driven by a national interest in non-proliferation. Trump has cut off the Obama policy of half-hearted and intermittent backing for rebel groups seen as moderate. But the Trump White House is also drawn by the desire to contain Iran, and that may yet pull the US deeper still into the battlefield. That is something that defence secretary James Mattis resisted in the latest wave of airstrikes but he may not prevail in the future.

In the US National Security Strategy document published late last year, Iran was considered a "hostile state". (The same document says that Turkey is a suspect state).

In fact, the fight against this "enemy state" is behind the United States' desire to control Syria, the driving force behind that desire.

The region has four major natural gas reserves, Russia, Qatar, Iran, Israel and Cyprus.

Iran conducts the bulk of the energy trade by sea.

The greatest hope and project for the Iranian state is the ability to transport natural gas to Europe via alternative routes.

The Iranian Energy Ministry has long been working on a pipeline to the Mediterranean through Iraq and Syria, without passing through Turkey. This is one of the main reasons why the United States is seeking to establish its presence in Syria.

Washington is working to prevent Syria from becoming an alternative route to exporting Iranian gas abroad and locking it into the country.

We know how disturbed the United States is about the rapprochement between Turkey and Iran. Let us recall that the Turkish-Iranian relations were the goal of the plot orchestrated by the United States itself and used by Gulen on December 17 and 25.

However, the US administration has not been able to prevent any move closer to the two countries, including the draft natural gas pipeline from Iran to Europe through Turkey.

As a result, we should know that the Syrian arena is for the United States, which began talks about the gradual loss of influence in the world, is a way to prove itself again.

Moreover, the United States cannot accept the opening of Syria, which will link Iran to the Mediterranean and through Turkey.

3- Iran

in the wake of recent Israeli airstrikes against the T-4 airbase in Syria and the shooting down of an Israeli F-16 fighter in February, Iranian-Israeli tensions have been escalating. On April 26, U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis spoke of the possibility of direct clashes between the two sides. And on the night of May 9, a rocket barrage was launched from Syrian territory, targeting Israeli positions in the Golan Heights.

At such a delicate moment, when the risk of miscalculation and confrontation is growing, it is essential that policymakers in Washington gain a clearer understanding of Iran's goals in Syria, which are not offensive but focus on deterring Israel and other major foreign stakeholders in Syria.

Misperceptions of Iran's strategic intentions could lead to military confrontation and an escalatory cycle — especially on the heels of U.S. President Donald Trump's decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear agreement.

Rather than provoking military confrontation with Israel, Iran's actions in Syria are first and foremost about preserving the Syrian government as part of the "axis of resistance"—a longstanding alliance between Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah, among others. Iran is also seeking to establish a balance of power — including deterrence — with other regional and international actors with interests in Syria. Recent Iranian actions that may be considered provocative, such as the Iranian drone that allegedly breached Israeli airspace, are tactics for drawing red lines and raising the costs for Israel if it chooses to confront Iran within Syria.

For the Israelis, Iran's military buildup is intolerable, as it crosses their red line of preventing permanent Iranian military bases in Syria. According to this inter-

pretation of events, the objective of Iran's Syria campaign is to expand its conventional power projection and military installations beyond its borders with the goal of destroying Israel. While some Iranian elites may share that goal, the prevailing Israeli view on Iran's Syrian presence misreads actual Iranian objectives and Tehran's current prioritization of interests in Syria.

This view also fails to take seriously the limitations Iran faces in Syria, especially the very real reluctance of the Syrian and Russian governments to allow Iran to have formal military installations inside the country. It readily assumes Syria has no say in how it manages its relations with Iran because of its weakness, when the reality on the ground is much more complicated. Broader power politics involving Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Russia, Israel, and the international community actually constrain Iran's Syria policy. The dominant narrative simultaneously portrays both an expanding Iran that is confrontational and a passive Iran that will not retaliate if attacked. Both of these perceptions are potentially dangerous, especially if they underestimate Iran's response to potential military attacks.

While Iran and its partners are staunchly anti-Israel, provoking a military standoff with Israel is not an Iranian priority. Instead, Iran is looking to consolidate its hard-won position in the power competition between the main stakeholders in the Syrian conflict: Turkey, the United States, and the Syrian government, along with their respective allies. Syria provides Iran with vital strategic depth, allowing it to project power through the Levant, and gives it a gateway to Hezbollah, enhancing Iranian deterrence of Israel. The collapse of the Assad regime and the dismemberment of the Syrian state would have dealt a significant blow to Iran with the loss of one of its few key allies in the Arab world.

Accordingly, from Iran's perspective, it is the party under threat in Syria. This view became entrenched among Iranian elites at the beginning of the Syrian conflict, as Iran was placed on the defensive and the probability of Assad surviving the protests seemed dim. Indeed, Iran's government believed the uprising against Assad was a foreign conspiracy designed to undermine Iran — a direct threat leading some to even claim that "if we lose Syria, we will not be able to preserve Tehran."

Iran has decided that the best way to preserve Syria's continued prominence in the axis of resistance is to make sure that the Syrian state achieves full control over its territory, especially given the very serious challenges Syria faces from rival armed groups after the demise of the Islamic State. It is true that Iran and its allied militias, the Syrian government, and Russia have the upper hand on the ground, but there seems to be no guarantee that the Syrian government can achieve full victory and unify the country given the military presence of Turkey and the United States there. In Tehran's perception, the situation is all the more precarious because Iranian leaders believe that the United States plans to divide Syria.

As U.S. and Israeli policymakers assess Iranian intentions in Syria, they would be wise to remember that Tehran has successfully expanded its influence in

power vacuums before. From Lebanon to Iraq to Yemen, Iran has made use of conflict zones that were not of its own making to further its strategic goals.

4- ISRAEL

With little ability to affect the outcome of the Syrian Crisis, and with limited interest in intervening in the conflict other than to pre-empt or respond to attacks on its territory, Israel seems to have been a passive actor in recent events shaping the Levant. But Israel does have critical security interests that it seeks to advance in Syria — principally, minimizing Iranian and Russian influence in Syria, blocking the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah, preventing Syria from posing a credible military threat to Israel or permitting Iran to do so, and preventing Sunni militants from establishing infrastructure or operational bases along Israel's border. Unless and until the Syrian conflict dramatically changes course, Israel's strategy will likely be to monitor events carefully, work with Moscow to minimize the chances of inadvertent conflict with Russia, and take as few direct actions as are necessary to protect Israel's territory and citizens. Given the unpalatability of the most-likely "resolutions" to the conflict, continued fighting in Syria — a situation in which these various parties continue to focus their fire on each other rather than on Israel — might be the most advantageous outcome for Israel.

Israel Has Five Main Objectives in the Syrian Conflict

Israel seeks to minimize Iranian and Russian influence in Syria, block the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah, prevent Syria from posing a credible military threat to Israel or permitting Iran to do so, undermine the legitimacy of Syria's claims to the Golan Heights, and prevent Sunni militants from establishing infrastructure or operational bases along Israel's border.

Israel can block Iranian assistance to Hezbollah by bombing weapon caches and shipments of materiel destined for the group. However, it has little ability to affect events on the ground in Syria, which means that it cannot moderate Iranian or Russian influence, affect the Assad regime's ability to survive, or influence what groups or individuals might succeed Assad. It has focused political, military, and clandestine efforts on keeping Iranian, Hezbollah, and Sunni extremist fighters away from areas close to the Israeli border, where they pose potential threats to Israel security.

However, the main Israeli objective was to establish a buffer zone in southern Syria and remove the Syrian army from the border with the occupied Syrian Golan at the cease-fire line in order to protect its national security.

5- Turkish

changes in Turkish security policy (e.g., pursuit of ISIL along with the PKK; relaxing of demands for Assad's removal; warming relations with Russia, etc.) do not necessarily indicate that Turkey's key interests and intentions have changed. Rather, the shifts should be seen as changes in objectives or tactics that are still thoroughly consistent with Turkey's fundamental and enduring security interests: 1) containing and ultimately eliminating Kurdish or other threats to Turkey's internal stability; and, 2) foiling Kurdish (or others')

ambitions that threaten the integrity of Turkey's borders. Former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence David Gompert (USNA, Rand) explains that recognizing Turkey's dire concern with territorial integrity goes a long way in clarifying what may at first blush appear to be inconsistent policies regarding Assad, Syria, ISIL and even its "traditional enmity" toward Russia. Gompert expresses the message clearly: "...we can count on the Turks to do whatever it takes to prevent Kurdish states on their southern border."

Key objectives underlying Turkey's actions

1) Defeating Terrorism.

Defeating terrorism against the Turkish state has generally meant the PKK in Turkey and Iraq and PYD/YPG in Syria, although once ISIL fighters brought the fight into Turkey, Ankara has expanded the focus of its efforts to include the Islamic State. The question of the impact on Turkey's security policy of Erdogan's bid ultimately to change Turkey's Constitution is a compelling and difficult to isolate. However, Professor Yesilada (Portland State) cites polls that show the political benefit Erdogan gains from these efforts: "91% of Turks support Erdogan's anti-terror campaign inside the country and 78% support his military intervention in Syria and Iraq (esp. re Mosul) and 88% view his security policies favorably."

2) Impeding Kurdish political and territorial gain.

Containing Kurdish political and territorial gains and obstructing activities that might by design or inadvertently lead to an autonomous Kurdish entity on Turkey's border, are critical Turkish objectives in northern Syria. Many experts see Turkey's pursuit of Operation Euphrates Shield as motivated by the desire to carve out a buffer zone in northern Syria and drive a solid wedge between Kurdish-controlled territory to the east and west to thwart emergence of a contiguous Kurdish region in northern Syria, that from its perspective would threaten both Turkey's internal stability and potentially control over its own territory.

3) Increasing Turkey's regional role and influence.

A number of experts noted Turkey's push to distance itself from EU and NATO. With respect to its recently thawed relations with Russia a number of the SMEs expect that Turkey will move cautiously in its relations with Russia as it seeks to as Gompert tags it, engage in "diversified outreach" to expand its list of international partners and carve out a more independent regional role for itself. They argue that Turkey has little to gain from upsetting the US to the degree that it loses US backing.

4) Assuring domestic support.

Finally, as suggested by the opinion poll results cited above, at present President Erdogan enjoys extremely high public approval for his security policy — especially along Turkey's border. Continuing to demonstrate the government's ability to provide security for Turks will be a key facet of Erdogan's overall popularity and ability to push through his preferred changes to Turkey's democratic system.

Conclusion

We note that there is a strong conflict in this region and that the interests of countries are the main factor in not reaching any solution to this crisis and we notice

when any party adopts a certain solution, the second party to block a solution.

We note that the main objective of some countries is to continue to destroy Syria and divide it in proportion to the interests of some countries and this division, which is rejected by Russia and Iran categorically, and in light of this crisis we see clearly that the Syrian crisis is linked to the conflict in the Middle East and linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria that refuse to establish relations with Israel and do not recognize Israel's presence in the occupied Palestinian territory.

From here we note the great complexity of the Syrian crisis, but everyone must cooperate to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Syria.

It is easy to conclude from the study that the war on Syria is a proxy war, and through the percentage of voting in the second figure it is clear that there is a statement of the respondents' opinion, where the majority believes that the war in Syria is a proxy war and on the other hand there is a section believed to be civil war or revolution

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ДЕФИНИЦИИ КОНФЛИКТОВ: СЕМАНТИЧЕСКИЙ АНАЛИЗ РОДОВОГО ПОНЯТИЯ

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CONFLICT DEFINITIONS: SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF GENERAL CONCEPT

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АННОТАЦИЯ

В статье рассмотрены некоторые вопросы семантического анализа понятия социальный конфликт, дефиниции политических конфликтов. Авторы анализируют ситуацию на востоке Украины и обосновывают предложения по разрешению политического конфликта на Донбассе.

ANNOTATION

This article examines some issues of semantic analysis of the concept of social conflict, the definition of political conflicts. The author analyses the situation in the East of Ukraine and provide suggestions for resolving the political conflict in the Donbass.

Ключевые слова: конфликт, политический конфликт, гражданская война, компромисс, консенсус, народная дипломатия.